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split-second pressures and an unprecedented barrage of information that was
often ambiguous, uncertain, contradictory, or quite often wrong.” The authors acknowledge a number of
changing characteristics in war, including the emphasis on speed, precision,
simultaneity, and the need for modular
force structure, interdependence between service units, and jointness at
lower levels. Yet they also stress that
true knowledge was rare. No matter
how sophisticated the intelligence collection, a real picture was rarely formed
until a human being laid eyes on the
target. Finally, the authors adroitly
connect the growing complexity of today’s battlefield with the need for
high-quality leaders who have been immersed in an intensive training and education regimen. The adaptability of
U.S. commanders made up for strategic
and intelligence inadequacies. It was
this mental agility that permitted the
creative, quick thinking that was so evident as American forces transitioned
from deliberate planning at Central
Command to reacting to real but unforeseen circumstances on the ground.
This final chapter overlooks a critical
shortfall in U.S. strategic readiness. The
U.S. military must become adept at
“multidimensional operations” to combat insurgencies and prop up failed
states. Murray and Scales admit that the
United States could have been better
prepared for the transition to stability
operations, and they admit that its military is inclined to “avoid the messy
business that lies beyond clear-cut, decisive military operations.” The U.S.
military excels at combined arms—the
combination of infantry, armor, and
artillery to enable fire and maneuver.
It is not as good at combined means—
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employing other instruments of national power, including the full panoply
of the interagency community toward a
desired end state. The American way of
war is unsurpassed at the fighting aspects of war, but this does not necessarily translate to winning the peace. This
shortfall was manifested by the failure
of both the Bush administration and
the military to prepare fully for its occupation of Iraq and the continuing
need to conduct the sort of nationbuilding activities that are occupying
the U.S. armed forces in Asia. The Pentagon is now examining innovative organizational and doctrinal changes to
address the problem. However, the solution lies beyond that five-sided structure and must include a maladroit
national security architecture that has
resisted substantive post–Cold War
realignment.
This is a remarkably impressive work,
especially since it was produced so close
to the fighting. Undoubtedly, a more
comprehensive assessment of the war
will eventually be produced, probably
years from now when distance, objectivity, and primary source material are
available. For the foreseeable future,
however, The Iraq War will be the definitive history of this complex and
multifaceted campaign.
F. G. HOFFMAN

Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
Quantico, Virginia
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The threat of force is an instrument of
statecraft—an instrument that U.S.
presidents have not been afraid to use.
When successfully employed, the threat
of force can deter an adversary from
embarking upon an unwelcome course
of action or coerce an adversary to
cease undesirable activities. Scholars
and practitioners both acknowledge
that of these two means of force, coercion is by far the more difficult to
execute.
The United States and Coercive Diplomacy attempts to increase our understanding of coercive diplomacy by
building upon works of other scholars
of international relations, in particular
Alexander George, the noted scholar of
international relations. The appearance
of this book is especially timely, since
the 1990s witnessed numerous attempts
on the part of the White House to employ coercive diplomacy—a trend that
has continued to the present day. Given
such potentially contentious issues as
the North Korean and Iranian nuclear
programs, Chinese-Taiwanese relations,
and the global war on terror, it appears
that coercive diplomacy has a high
probability of continued use.
The editors take a straightforward approach to their subject. A brief introduction by Robert Art defines the term
“coercive diplomacy,” discusses its use
by national leaders, and describes the
structure of the book. In the following
seven chapters, contributing authors
present seven case studies that have involved U.S. efforts to employ coercive
diplomacy. Each study seeks to determine whether coercive diplomacy was
successful and why success or failure
resulted. These studies are followed by
a concluding chapter in which Art reviews the contributors’ findings and
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provides his own comparisons. He then
offers general conclusions regarding coercive diplomacy and several recommendations that national leaders
should consider.
Taken in its entirety, The United States
and Coercive Diplomacy is a worthy
book, deserving attention from those in
both academia and government. The
writing is articulate, the chapters well
organized, and the conclusions reasonable. More importantly, this book belongs to the all-too-small family of
books that contribute to, as Alexander
George once wrote, “bridging the gap”
between academicians and national
leaders, between theory and practice.
That said, there are some drawbacks to
this work. Structurally, it would have
benefited if the contributors had followed a common format when presenting and analyzing their various cases.
Also, the definition of the term “coercive diplomacy” lacks precision, as Art
readily admits. However, it is clear that
coercive diplomacy employs a threat of
force, and sometimes the use of force,
to get a target (the recipient of the coercive threat) to do something that the
coercer wants but that the target does
not. The editors make a point of distinguishing between coercive efforts, which
do not involve the threat of force, and
coercive diplomacy, which does. While
the inclusion of the threat of force
clearly marks a coercive threshold, a
deeper discussion of coercive efforts
would have been of significant interest
to those who may have to use coercion
as part of statecraft. Even more problematic is the question of the degree of
force required to distinguish coercive
diplomacy from war. Robert Art notes
that the line is not easily drawn or distinct; the discussion and case studies
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reinforce that observation. Presumably
the distinction is an important one, and
potentially there are different cautions
and prescriptions to be followed for the
different strategies.
The cases examined in the book are well
chosen and have been studied at the
Naval War College. They examine the
efforts made by the Clinton administration to use coercive diplomacy in Somalia, Bosnia/Kosovo, and Haiti; in the
1995–96 Taiwan Strait confrontation;
to coerce the North Koreans into abandoning their nuclear weapons program;
and several attempts to use coercive diplomacy against Saddam Hussein from
1990 to 1998. The final study discusses
the use of coercive diplomacy in the
U.S. response to terrorism. Interestingly, and perhaps inadvertently, the
cases are presented in ascending order
of quality.
The Somalia case, written by Nora
Bensahel, concludes that providing security for humanitarian relief efforts
was a success for U.S. coercive diplomacy. As Art points out, there can be a
fine line between compellance and deterrence. Bensahel’s study would seem
to make a stronger case for a successful
deterrent strategy being initially employed, not a coercive one. However,
there can be no doubt that this turned
into an attempt to use coercive diplomacy as a tool in the nation-building
efforts that subsequently followed, and
that it failed.
Both the Somalia and Bosnia/Kosovo
discussions suffer from brevity. Of
course, a certain degree of editing is inevitable for these complex and lengthy
cases, but too much has been left out,
most notably a detailed discussion of
the impact of the Croatian ground
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offensive that occurred in conjunction
with the NATO air campaign in 1995. It
could also be argued that the Kosovo
campaign was an exercise in coercive
diplomacy from beginning to end and
never truly transitioned into a “war.”
The meticulous selection of targets,
some of which were chosen more for
psychological than purely military impact; the extremely limiting rules of engagement employed by NATO; and the
eventual introduction of the threat of a
ground campaign make Kosovo appear
to be a case of “tightening the screw”
vice a failure of coercive diplomacy. Of
course, both conclusions are debatable.
Robert Pastor was privileged to be present at the last-minute, face-to-face negotiations between General Raul Cedras
(the leader of the Haitian coup), Jimmy
Carter, Colin Powell, and Sam Nunn.
Pastor’s account is spellbinding, but it
can be argued that he overstates the importance of these negotiations in his
presentation of the Haitian case. Art
again deflects much of the criticism associated with this observation when he
admits that the Haitian case is not easy
to categorize. Is it a case of successful
coercive diplomacy at the last minute,
or one of the shortest and least sanguinary combats on record, given that
Cedras did not capitulate until after receiving positive confirmation that an
invasion force was en route?
Jon B. Alterman’s discussion of Iraq,
like that of Somalia and Bosnia/Kosovo,
covers much temporal ground in relatively few pages. Among the more significant questions addressed is whether
the Tomahawk missile attacks conducted against Iraq in response to the
discovery of a plot to assassinate former
president Bush were truly an example
of coercive diplomacy. It seems at least
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equally likely that the attacks had nothing to do with coercion and were simply a form of reprisal.
Three of the final four cases, written by
William Drennan (Korea), Robert S.
Ross (China-Taiwan), and Martha
Crenshaw (war on terror), are very
good. Both Drennan’s and Crenshaw’s
work deserve special mention. Drennan
advances the argument that it was
North Korea, not the United States,
that successfully employed coercive diplomacy in the Korean nuclear crisis,
and he offers compelling justification
for his conclusion. Crenshaw takes on
the extremely topical and thorny issue
of whether coercive diplomacy has even
a remote chance of success when employed against extremely dedicated
nonstate actors. The well laid out conclusion is that it is not possible to use
coercive diplomacy directly against
such actors but it is possible to use coercive diplomacy against state actors
that may also be involved.
In many ways Art’s final chapter is the
capstone piece of the book—as it
should be. One of his major conclusions is that efforts to use coercive diplomacy fail two out of every three
times. To his credit, he takes care to
temper this finding with caution. For
example, he admits that leaders may
embrace a strategy of coercive diplomacy to convince a domestic audience
that “everything has been tried” to gain
support for war, rather than any effort
to truly change the target’s behavior.
Thus some historical examples of
“failures” of coercive diplomacy may
have been initiated with no expectation of international success. He also
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tangentially touches another potential
category of “failure” that should have
been explored in greater depth and
might skew the percentage of failures
attributed to coercive diplomacy. One
of Art’s prescriptions for policy makers
is that coercive diplomacy should never
be attempted unless one is willing to go
to war if the effort fails. Sound advice,
but even a state that has already decided
to go to war should perceive a longshot attempt at coercive diplomacy not
as a policy failure per se but merely as
an option with a chance, however small,
of a large payoff with potentially no cost.
Art distills the findings of this book into
six guidelines for practitioners who
wish to employ coercive diplomacy.
Four of these were initially postulated
by Alexander George; their wisdom is
reconfirmed by the research in this
work. Two additional guidelines are described as prerequisites for having a
chance at successfully utilizing coercive
diplomacy. “Demonstrative denial” is a
form of coercive diplomacy that works
better than “limited punishment.” The
other type of coercive diplomacy has already been mentioned. These guidelines
are far more than just a reiteration of
“common sense” or “good diplomatic
practices,” but true aids and cautions to
decision makers and should not be
taken lightly.
The United States Institute for Peace
should be commended for backing this
project, which deserves an audience
both inside academia and inside the
Beltway.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College
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